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We discuss recent progress in the development of cognitive ontologies and summarize
three challenges in the coordinated development and application of these resources.
Challenge 1 is to adopt a standardized deﬁnition for cognitive processes.We describe three
possibilities and recommend one that is consistent with the standard view in cognitive and
biomedical sciences. Challenge 2 is harmonization. Gaps and conﬂicts in representation
must be resolved so that these resources can be combined for mark-up and interpretation
of multi-modal data. Finally, Challenge 3 is to test the utility of these resources for large-
scale annotation of data, search and query, and knowledge discovery and integration. As
term deﬁnitions are tested and revised, harmonization should enable coordinated updates
across ontologies. However, the true test of these deﬁnitions will be in their community-
wide adoption which will test whether they support valid inferences about psychological
and neuroscientiﬁc data.
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INTRODUCTION
Mental processes unfold at multiple levels, from the cellular
dynamics of memory consolidation to sensory and motor behav-
iors that engage the entire brain and body. Thus, a comprehen-
sive understanding of the phenomena associated with cognition
requires coordinated contributions from at least psychology, biol-
ogy, and neuroscience (Albus et al., 2007). The last two decades
have seen unprecedented steps toward this goal, with accelerated
use of neuroimaging (PET and fMRI), neurophysiology (EEG),
and neurogenomics, together with experimental paradigms from
cognitive, clinical, and neuro-psychology (Jones and Mendell,
1999).
While these methods have produced a wealth of high-quality
data about mental functioning1, major advances will require not
justmore data, but newways of integrating, processing, andunder-
standing the data (Decety and Cacioppo, 2010; Akil et al., 2011).
Recently, ontologies have emerged as a key tool to support these
efforts. An ontology is a formal representation of the types of
entities in a given domain, along with their properties and inter-
relationships. Recent projects, such as the Cognitive Paradigm
1 For the purposes of this article, the authors agree to use “mental process,”“mental
functioning,” and “cognition” synonymously. Distinctions are often made between
these, and while there can be good reason to do so in certain cases, clarifying the
distinctions here would go beyond our scope.
Ontology (CogPO, Turner and Laird, 2012), Neural Electromag-
netic Ontologies (NEMO, Frishkoff et al., 2009, 2011a,b), the
Neuroscience Information Framework (NIF, Gardner et al., 2008;
Imam et al., 2012), and the Cognitive Atlas (Poldrack et al., 2011),
show that ontologies can be used to link data across neuroscien-
tiﬁc databases and other resources (e.g., Imam et al., 2012) and
to facilitate meta-analyses of neuroimaging data (e.g., Laird et al.,
2009; Frishkoff et al., 2011a; Fox and Friston, 2012; Turner and
Laird, 2012).
The present paper summarizes these recent efforts and
describes three challenges in the development and integration
of cognitive ontologies. Challenge 1 is to adopt standardized
deﬁnitions for cognitive processes, and integrate cognitive pro-
cesses within the framework offered by a foundation (upper-
level) ontology shared with other biomedical ontologies. We
describe three possibilities and recommend one that is con-
sistent with the standard view in cognitive and biomedical
sciences.
Challenge 2 is harmonization of terms across ontologies. A
search for “memory” in BioPortal (Noy et al., 2009) returns over
150 terms from 30 ontologies2. These and other basic terms,
such as “perception,” “planning,” and “emotion,” have multiple
and sometimes conﬂicting deﬁnitions across ontologies. These
2http://bioportal.bioontology.org/search?query=memory&commit=Search
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conﬂicts must be resolved so that multiple ontologies can be com-
bined for mark-up and interpretation of multi-modal data. In
the present paper, we describe the scope of several cognitive and
biomedical ontologies and suggest areas for improved coordina-
tion in their development and application.
Challenge 3 is to test the utility of cognitive ontologies for
large-scale data annotation, search and query, and ontology-
based analysis. While Challenge 1 is concerned with ontology
development, Challenges 2 and 3 reﬂect an interest in ontology
harmonization and application. As term deﬁnitions are tested
and revised, harmonization should enable coordinated updates
across ontologies. However, the true test of these deﬁnitions
will be whether they support valid inferences about psycho-
logical and neuroscientiﬁc data. We conclude with our view
on the future of the development and application of cognitive
ontologies.
CHALLENGE #1: DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING MENTAL
PROCESSES
Understanding the relationship between mental functioning and
brain activity is a unifying aim for biology, neuroscience, psy-
chology, and related ﬁelds. Upper-level ontologies, such as the
Basic Formal Ontology (BFO; Smith and Grenon, 2004), can
provide domain-independent integrating classes and domain-
bridging relationships that can serve as a starting point for the
annotation of data arising from this difﬁcult search for under-
standing. Anatomical entities such as the central nervous system
are classiﬁed as objects within BFO, and BFO also allows for “ﬁat”
object parts for the classiﬁcation of entities that have been arbitrar-
ily (but usefully) divided into sections, e.g., the nervous system is
divided into the central and peripheral nervous systems, although
they are physically continuous through the connections of neurons
residing in each division. Brain activity is classiﬁed as a process in
BFO, and the anatomical entities are related via a participation
relation to those processes.
Within BFO there are three possible ways to represent the rela-
tionship between mental processes and brain processes (Frishkoff,
2012). According to the ﬁrst view, mental processes are distinct
from physical (e.g., brain) processes. This is a folk psychological
view and represents a kind of dualism: there are physical enti-
ties, and there are nonphysical (mental) entities. In contrast, the
second and third views represent mental processes as a subclass
of physiological (bodily) processes. The second view characterizes
mental processes as a type of bodily process that is distinct from
brain processes, while the third view holds that mental processes
are a subtype of brain processes.
The ﬁrst view, dualism, may generate hypotheses that are dif-
ﬁcult or impossible to test within a scientiﬁc framework and is
justiﬁably scientiﬁcally unpopular. In contrast, the second and
third views are consistent with what we know about the phys-
iological basis of cognition. Both assert that mental processes
are physical processes, while the third view goes one step fur-
ther in asserting that mental processes unfold solely in the brain,
not the autonomic (reproductive, digestive) system or periph-
eral sensory and motor areas (e.g., hands, feet). This view is
consistent with much of what we know about sensorimotor func-
tions, emotion and motivation, and more complex cognitive
processes. On the other hand, if we wish to embrace a more
embodied view of cognition, we could argue that interactions
between the brain and body (visceral and somatic processes) are
integral to cognition. Therefore, we may not wish to exclude
physiological processes outside the brain in representing mental
phenomena. For this reason, we recommend either the sec-
ond or third view as a reasonable starting point for cognitive
ontologies.
Like any complex system, cognition comprises multiple sub-
systems. Most researchers would agree that cognitive subsystems
include at least perception, attention, short- and long-term
memory, decision-making, language, and emotion (James, 1890;
Poldrack et al., 2011). Consequently, any ontology of mental
functioning is likely to include terms for at least these sorts of phe-
nomena. However, many ﬁner-grained distinctions can be drawn.
Theories of cognition differ in whether and how they draw these
distinctions, and in how the subsystems assumed by the theory are
thought to interact and give rise to patterns of behavior.
Mental phenomena cannot be observed in the same way that
behavior or brain activity can be observed. A scientiﬁc study must
therefore “operationalize,” or deﬁne, a mental process with respect
to a particular experimental framework. To this end, researchers
have devised a variety of experimental paradigms (Turner and
Laird, 2012). Each paradigm includes a set of explicit instructions
for subjects to behave in certain ways (e.g., attend, then push a
button) in response to different stimuli (e.g., words or faces). Out-
come measures include response time and accuracy, as well as
patterns of physiological (bodily or brain) activity. For example,
Fliessbach et al. (2010) examined how the strength of a mem-
ory (operationalized in terms of response accuracy) depended on
the way that people learn, or encode, new information. Some
participants were asked to perform an orthographic (letter) judg-
ment, while others were asked to perform a semantic (meaning)
judgment. Results showed that memory recall was better for the
semantic task, providing support for a familiar construct in psy-
chology of memory, known as “depth of processing.” This study
illustrates how experimental variables are used to operationally
deﬁne a mental phenomenon. At the same time, we note that
operational deﬁnitions rely on particular measurement meth-
ods, and these methods may not be sensitive to all aspects of
the phenomenon of interest, or may reﬂect additional processes,
e.g., so-called task demands. Therefore, converging evidence from
multiple methods is essential for studies of cognition.
In this context, the BrainMap database (Laird et al., 2005) and
the Cognitive Paradigm ontology (Figure 1, Turner and Laird,
2012) have been used to annotate behavioral and brain data
in order to test hypotheses about brain-behavior relationships.
BrainMap is a large curated repository of cognitive neuroimaging
studies that can be used to explore relationships between behav-
ior and patterns of brain activity (mainly from PET and fMRI).
It encodes core experiment metadata, including the conditions,
tasks, responses and measurement methods. Using this struc-
ture, experimental results can be grouped together, based on the
objective similarities among the stimuli, task instructions, and
measures, regardless of whether the experiment was designed to
study a particular subsystem, such as memory, executive function,
or attention (Burns and Turner, 2013).
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FIGURE 1 | A partial representation of the Cognitive Paradigm Ontology (CogPO).
The Cognitive Atlas (Poldrack et al., 2011) represents a com-
plementary effort. Using a wikipedia-style (or “bazaar” approach;
Raymond, 1999), the Cognitive Atlas captures a wide range of
terminology used in cognitive science, relating operational mea-
sures to the types of mental functioning that they are designed
to measure. For example, the Cognitive Atlas contains state-
ments such as “‘pattern comparison task’3 measures ‘processing
capacity”’4.
In clinical neuropsychology, behavioral and self-report mea-
sures (called “neuropsychological tests”) are widely used for
the diagnosis and treatment of patients with psychological and
developmental disorders. Neurological assessment rests on the
theory that the nature and location of brain damage, either
by disease or injury, can be discovered by testing patients’
cognitive functioning. The NeuroPsychological Testing Ontol-
ogy (NPT5) has been used to characterize these tests, which
include measures of cognitive abilities, such as short-term vs.
long-term memory recall or executive functioning. The Neu-
rological Disease Ontology (ND6) classiﬁes entities relevant to
neurological diseases, such as Alzheimer’s and multiple scle-
rosis. Diseases are classiﬁed and related to diagnostic criteria
and to neuropathology. A key challenge in clinical and cogni-
tive neuroscience is to understand how physiological disorders
due to trauma or disease are related to cognitive deﬁcits, such
as memory loss or aphasia. We expect that harmonization
3http://www.cognitiveatlas.org/task/id/trm_4da86cb034ff6
4http://www.cognitiveatlas.org/concept/id/trm_4a3fd79d0adf4
5http://code.google.com/p/neuropsychological-testing-ontology/
6http://code.google.com/p/neurological-disease-ontology/
of the NPT, ND, and similar resources, will support this
goal.
CHALLENGE #2: INTEROPERABILITY OF COGNITIVE
ONTOLOGIES
Several cognitive ontologies have been mentioned thus far. In
recent years, psychology has embraced methods and insights from
the biological sciences, including molecular genetics, evolution-
ary biology, and physiology (Kandel, 2008). These methods show
the brain at multiple orders of spatial resolution, from genes to
neural maps to interacting systems. Likewise, medical research
has increasingly turned to biological evidence for explanations of
mental disorders, such as depression and schizophrenia (Weyandt,
2006). As a result, many bio-ontologies now also include termi-
nology for mental processes. For example, the Gene Ontology
(GO), widely used for cross-species annotation of the functions of
gene products (Ashburner et al., 2000), includes terms for “cogni-
tion,”“learning,” and“memory,” among others. This inter-domain
diversity of ontologies including terminology for cognitive entities
is accompanied by diversity in deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation.
To coordinate work across domains and promote convergence,
the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry (Smith et al.,
2007) provides recommendations on best practices in ontol-
ogy development, such as re-use of existing terms, community
involvement (i.e. being “open”), and standardization of meta-data
practices. In our experience, these standards have contributed to
the quality and interoperability of neuroscientiﬁc and cognitive
ontologies. For example, these ontologies have largely adopted
BFO as a common upper ontology, and there is extensive reuse of
mid-level ontologies, such as OBI, IAO, OGMS, and UBERON, as
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Table 1 | An overview of ontology efforts for cognitive processes and related domains.
Name/RRID Location Status Citation Scope Upper Related
Mental Functioning
Ontology (MF)/
RRID:nlx_157305
http://purl.bioontology.
org/ontology/MF
Alpha Hastings et al.
(2012)
Cognitive processes
and dispositions
BFO 2.0 OBI/IAO, OGMS
Cognitive Paradigm
Ontology (CogPO)/
RRID:nlx_155537
http://purl.bioontology.
org/ontology/COGPO
Release
(v1.0)
Turner and
Laird (2012)
Cognitive experimental
paradigms
BFO 1.1 OBI/IAO,
BrainMap
Neural Electromagnetic
Ontologies (NEMO)/
RRID:nif-0000-10899
http://purl.bioontology.
org/ontology/NEMO
Release
(v3.2)
Frishkoff et al.
(2009)
Cognitive and brain
processes, EEG and
ERP measures
BFO 1.1 OBI/IAO, NIFSTD,
CogPO, UO
Neuroscience Information
Framework (NIFSTD)/
RRID:nlx_144512
http://purl.bioontology.
org/ontology/NIFSTD
Release
(v2.9)
Imam et al.
(2012)
Brain anatomy
(cross-species)
BFO 1.1 OBI/IAO,
UBERON, CogPO
Cognitive Atlas (COGAT)/
RRID:nif-0000-24591
http://purl.bioontology.org/
ontology/COGAT
Release
(v1.0)
Poldrack et al.
(2011)
Cognitive processes,
cognitive experimental
paradigms
– CogPO
Neurological Disease
Ontology (ND)/
RRID:nlx_157304
http://code.google.com/p/
neurological-disease-ontology/
Alpha Jensen et al.
(2013)
Neurological disorders,
neuropathology
BFO 2.0 OBI, GO, OGMS,
CL, ChEBI, PR
Neuro Behavioral
Ontology (NBO)/
RRID:nlx_151745
http://purl.bioontology.org/
ontology/NBO
Beta Gkoutos et al.
(2012)
Behavioral processes
and phenotypes
– GO, ChEBI,
UBERON
NeuroPsychological
Testing Ontology (NPT)/
RRID:nlx_157303
https://code.google.com/p/
neuropsychological-testing-
ontology/
Alpha Cox et al.
(2013)
Cognitive assessment,
behavioral measures
BFO 2.0 OBI/IAO
OBI, Ontology of Biological Investigations; IAO, Information Artifact Ontology; OGMS, Ontology for General Medical Science; UO, Units Ontology; UBERON, Uber
Anatomy Ontology; CL, Cell Ontology; ChEBI, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest Ontology; PR, Protein Ontology.
All ontologies are available via http://www.obofoundry.org/
shown in Table 1. This re-use ensures that corresponding terms
across ontologies share exactly the same identiﬁer and deﬁnition,
thus seamlessly harmonizing the resulting data annotations.
A guiding principle of the OBO Foundry is that of ontological
realism, which suggests that ontologies should aim“to identify the
sorts of entities that exist... according to the best current scientiﬁc
understanding” (Smith and Ceusters, 2010). Ontological realism
is a foundation for BFO and, in our view, has effectively promoted
a community-wide focus on representing scientiﬁc knowledge.
Interestingly, ontological realism might be seen to be challenged
by the need to represent certain mental phenomena, such as
hallucination, that can reference entities that do not exist. One
solution is to distinguish these processes, which can be viewed
as non-canonical, from canonical perception, in which perceptual
representations are triggered by sensory stimuli. Perception is rela-
tional in the sense that it brings the subject into contact with an
external object in theworld (Mulligan and Smith, 1986). Just as the
Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA, Rosse and Mejino, 2003)
contains terms for arm and leg, but not for amputation stump
or shriveled arm, ontologies that represent canonical mental pro-
cesses would contain terms for visual and aural perception, but
not for synaesthesia or tinnitus. Terms like these would belong in
extension ontologies relating to speciﬁc types of mental or neu-
rological disease (Ceusters and Smith, 2010). By focusing on the
canonical case, perceptual processes (for example) can safely be
deﬁned as representing objects and involving beliefs about those
objects. A next challenge, then, is to capture the relationships
between canonical and non-canonical processes, acknowledging
that some core sub-processes in normal perception are similar, or
even identical, to those in (e.g.) hallucinating.
CHALLENGE #3: APPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE ONTOLOGIES
In addition to data annotation and integration, ontologies
can be used for improved search and retrieval of other
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resources and for reasoning over data within as well as across
experiments.
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL
The Neuroscience Information Framework7 (NIF) provides for
search and retrieval across a wide range of resources, includ-
ing publications, databases and other information sources.
The search engine is backed by the NIF ontology (NIFSTD),
which supports better formalization and integration of exist-
ing resources. For example, the ontologies include semantically
based mappings between related terms, such as “cognition”
and “mental process.” Therefore, an ontology-based search
that includes only one of these terms still provides excellent
coverage.
DATA ANNOTATION
Ontologies are increasingly used for data annotation. For example,
the behaviors of model organisms arewidely used as proxies for the
study of mental processes and disorders in humans (e.g. Cryan and
Holmes, 2005; Wu and Luo, 2005; Mathur and Guo, 2010). Build-
ing on the GO, the NeuroBehaviour Ontology (NBO, Gkoutos
et al., 2012) represents behavior and is used for model organism
data annotation. Formalization of the relationships between the
behavior and assumed homologies in mental functioning repre-
sented in ontologies would support better data integration and
translation in this domain.
ONTOLOGY-BASED ANALYSIS
Finally, ontologies can be used to reason across data, e.g., for
classiﬁcation of complex patterns (as supported by NEMO, Bilder
et al., 2009; Frishkoff et al., 2009, 2011a,b; Poldrack et al., 2012).
To enable cross-domain applications, Hastings et al. (2012)
have proposed a Mental Functioning Ontology (MF) which
includes inter-ontology bridging modules. A bridging module
assigns semantic relationships between terms in different ontolo-
gies, such as identity, parthood, or realization. Bridging modules
exist independently of each of the source ontologies but enable
applications to safely draw on both of the ontologies, harnessing
the knowledge-based relational links between them. Our vision is
that MF will support harmonization of search and analysis tools
across biochemical, biological, and medical data. In doing so, we
wish to achieve stronger links between biological research (“bench
sciences”), translational research, and medical records. Due to the
explicit relationship between disorder categories and lower-level
mental processes, we further anticipate that MF might help to
further disambiguate data in diagnostic categories for mental dis-
orders that show high levels of co-morbidity (Hastings and Schulz,
2012).
OUTLOOK: WHAT IS NEEDED FOR THE FUTURE?
In the last few years, multiple ontologies have been created for
representation, annotation, and reasoning about cognitive func-
tioning, and for the representation of related behavior and brain
data in different experimental contexts. Table 1 gives an overview
of these efforts. At present, there is no one project that unites
these efforts, although there is considerable cross-pollination,
7http://www.neuinfo.org/
as reﬂected in the “Related” column, which shows mid-level
ontologies that are shared across projects.
For researchers, mapping between different ontologies can
present challenges, as independent ontologies may reﬂect different
assumptions, methodological practices and scientiﬁc viewpoints
(as reﬂected, for example, in conﬂicting deﬁnitions). It is inef-
ﬁcient and prone to error for each consumer of the combined
research data to re-do the mapping independently, and the
difﬁculty in harmonizing hinders the integration of the knowl-
edge contained in their respective annotations into a broader
understanding that spans genetic, molecular, cellular and psy-
chological levels of description. As the underlying science pro-
gresses, each of these ontologies will evolve in slightly different
ways, rendering any mapping potentially out of date in the
future.
Rather than post hoc mapping efforts on a project-by-project
basis, what is needed is a coordinated international effort towards
ontology integration. Ontology integration involves the creation
of bridging modules between ontologies that accurately reﬂect the
shared understanding of the semantic relationships between the
entities in the different ontologies. This is necessary in order to
allow comparison and alignment (and thus maximally effective
use) of empirical research data ﬂowing from different sources and
methodologies. Since the ontologies and the annotations (data)
are separated, ontology-based integration does not change the way
researchers in different areas work and in no way forces unwanted
theoretical or methodological frameworks onto them. Rather,
ontology-based integration ﬂows from the use of a set of com-
mon and integrated ontologies to annotate their data. We believe
that with some coordinated effort it will be possible to create such
common ontologies (in fact, we have already taken some steps in
this direction, as described above) in a way that remains neutral
as between different methodological approaches and fundamental
assumptions.
We believe is the way forward includes (a) continued use of
existingontologies for data annotationbyprimarydata-generating
researchers and deposition of those annotated data into shared
repositories, alongside (b) ontology-based integration through the
creation of shared semantic bridging modules between different
ontologies and the increased convergence (as recommended by the
OBO Foundry) on re-use of shared components between different
ontologies, shared upper and mid-level ontologies, and shared
metadata standards.
We are currently building on existing active collaborations
among ontology developers, and working towards creating a
set of resources that the diverse interdisciplinary community of
researchers will be able to stand behind. This will require a
large-scale coordinated effort. However, in this era of increas-
ingly data-driven science, as the focus turns to carefully retaining
and making data available to drive reproducibility, we believe
that there has never been a greater need, and also not a better
opportunity.
CONCLUSION
We have described recent efforts in the development of cognitive
ontologies and their use in annotation, integration and analysis of
clinical and cognitive neuroscience data. A cross-cutting goal is to
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identify classes of behavior and brain activity that are related to dif-
ferent types of mental processes. This ambitious aim is consistent
with recent calls for large-scale brain-mapping and support for
translational neuroscience (e.g., Neuroimaging Informatics Tools
and Resources Clearinghouse; Human Brain Project; the Brain
Initiative – Devor et al., 2013), projects that are likely to beneﬁt
from the development and harmonization of cognitive ontolo-
gies. There is a pressing need for coordinated efforts across related
disciplines. The NIF plays a key role as an interconnecting hub and
primary consumer formany of the ontology efforts described here.
There is a real need to provide clear and community-negotiated
deﬁnitions for core high-level entities within the domain, but for
this effort to succeed, wide-scale community participation must
be achieved.
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